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Introduction 
The Salafist Group for Call (or Preaching) and Combat (GSPC), was born out of Algeria’s Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA) which threatened Algeria and its inhabitants after the country outlawed and 
imprisoned members of Algeria’s largest Islamic party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), following 
the legislative elections in 1992. GSPC, a splinter group of GIA, formed to offer an alternative to 
the murderous tactics of its parent organization. For years following the voided election in 1992, 
GIA “engaged in frequent attacks against civilians (especially journalists, intellectuals and secular 
schools) and government workers, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation. 
From 1993 to 1998, about 70,000 civilians were killed in surprise raids throughout the country. 
Also in 1993, GIA announced a campaign against foreigners living in Algeria, and subsequently 
killed more than 100 expatriates, predominantly Europeans. The group uses assassinations and 
bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their 
throats.”[1] While both GSPC and GIA espouse Islamizing the government of Algeria, their 
respective tactics helped to create the divide. According to both militants within GSPC and 
western experts, “GSPC pledged to avoid inflicting civilian casualties in Algeria. While the group 
has in fact killed civilians, the numbers are significantly less than the casualties of the GIA. 
Instead, GSPC concentrates on targeting Algerian government and security forces, especially 
those in rural areas. The group has also pledged to attack Western targets and has been linked 
to several foiled attacks against U.S. and European targets in Western Europe.”[2] This message 
was again reiterated by the Media Wing of GSPC in January 2005 when they stated during an 
interview with Al-Faath , “It was announced that the GSPC was a continuation of what the jihad 
had been built on. It was agreed to change the name of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) to the 
GSPC because the first name had become a slogan of advocates of Takfir wal-Hijra 
[Excommunication and Exile]. Many operations were attributed to those who had adopted this 
path. It is a continuation of GIA … before it went astray … [GSPC] was to denounce the 
massacres that had been committed against the people and also the truce of the dictatorship.”[3] 
These differences are important, but more so is the apparent evolution and potential digression of 
GSPC operations as it devolves and changes over time.  
According to regional literature and Western experts, GSPC is in a state of decline as a result of 
the successful capture and killing of group leaders, state amnesty programs (specifically the Civil 
Concord Restoration Act and Algeria’s Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation), and 
Saharan state military crackdown under Western guidance and assistance.[4] As the organization 
declines, the original political and ideological bases for the group’s formation may be devolving 
from the original intent of the GSPC and its advocates. Likewise, its strategy and operations may 
exhibit an attendant shift. As this ideological and operational devolution continues, and as al 
Qaeda and the GSPC leadership publicly announce an alliance, questions regarding the group's 
future operational and strategic outlook emerge. What impact will the remaining GSPC members 
and supporters within the African and European region have on U.S. interests? Faced with the 
potentially obsolete or unattainable goal of Islamizing the government in Algiers, will GSPC and 
its diaspora redirect their operations, attention, and resources from France and West Africa 
toward the United States and its interests around the world?  
GSPC’s international impact has been relatively small and has been limited to infrequent 
resource generating operations leading to arrests of GSPC and al Qaeda members and diaspora 
affiliates in a number European and Middle Eastern countries. In 2001, seven men, along with 
Abu Qatada, a suspected high-level al-Qaeda operative, were arrested on suspicion of 
involvement in GSPC’s “English cell.” Also during that year, Spanish police dismantled a six-man 
cell that had sent high-tech equipment and intelligence to operatives in Algeria. According to 
President Jose Maria Aznar Lopez, the cell had “financial connections to the terrorist organization 
led by bin Laden.” In September 2002, two Algerians believed to be members of GSPC were 
arrested in Pakistan with false passports and forgery equipment. In April 2003, Dutch authorities 
arrested several Algerians “accused of supporting terrorist activities” carried out by GSPC. Finally, 
the Italian government definitively linked a high-ranking GSPC member in Milan to cadres of 
Ansar al-Islam, the al-Qaeda affiliate that continues to attack U.S. soldiers in Iraq. As GSPC’s 
relationship with al Qaeda matures, GSPC’s operations in Algeria and throughout Europe may 
become a more serious concern in the war on terror. Noting this concern “some intelligence 
experts fear the group is moving towards a global objective, along the lines of al-Qaeda. However, 
GSPC still appears dedicated to its primary objective, the establishment of an Islamist state in 
Algeria.”[5] Despite the ambiguity of GSPC’s internationalization, clearly, even this relatively 
obscure group, which has historically conducted operations only in Algeria, has the potential for 
greater global reach with connections to its international sponsor, al Qaeda. For historical 
reasons, the United States has largely left this problem in the hands of France.[6] 
The uncertainty regarding GSPC operations creates a need for further review. Current literature 
and analysis is scarce and, as will be shown, potentially inaccurate. As a result, this research 
paper will provide a descriptive analysis of GSPC operations in an attempt to show patterns and 
potential direction of GSPC future operations.  
A brief review of the paper’s objective, environmental inputs and behavioral outputs will set the 
stage prior to reviewing the research methodology and assumptions, hypothesis analysis and 
observation, and areas for future research. 
Objective 
The objective of this research is to devise a descriptive analysis of GSPC operations. Such 
analysis should help to identify GSPC behavioral trends and vulnerabilities. 
Environmental Inputs 
Numerous environmental factors influence GSPC operations. Significant events outside of GSPC 
control, such as the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, the Civil Concord 
Restoration Act, and other Algerian amnesty initiatives shape the greater environment in which 
GSPC operates. These factors may directly affect GSPC’s Algerian constituency, its prospective 
members, or actual members. They may also draw external powers into play, such as the United 
States with its Global War on Terror (GWOT), or al-Qaeda with its campaign to co-opt various 
regional Islamist conflicts into its wider global jihad.  
Other significant events fall within GSPC control, such as voluntary leadership changeover. 
Additional operating environment factors like weather, population density, or natural disasters 
(e.g., the 2003 earthquake in Bourmerdes) probably shape GSPC behavior to an observable 
degree. 
Behavioral Outputs 
The two primary behavioral outputs that are observable are GSPC’s rhetoric (what they announce 
to various audiences) and their operations (what they do). As is often the case, the operations a 
group undertakes will not always correlate with their public pronouncements. In such 
circumstances, one might call the public statements “blustering” or idle rhetoric, but presenting a 
public face nonetheless gives clues as to the organization’s values, beliefs and intentions. When 
operational behavior does not follow rhetoric—particularly manifest in threats that the group fails 
to make good on—it may indicate a lack of capability. One might expect operations to exhibit 
closer congruence to public rhetoric if the group enhances its operational capacity. In other cases, 
the group may simply broadcast public statements to appeal to a constituency from which the 
group requires positive support, or wishes to keep placated so as to deter active interference; all 
the while, the group follows an operational strategy that does not follow its rhetorical tack. 
Methodology and Assumptions 
For the purpose of this research unclassified sources were utilized to analyze GSPC’s operations 
descriptively. The original intent was to utilize RAND and the Oklahoma City National Memorial 
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) database[7] to filter and identify GSPC operational 
data from time of organizational inception to May 25, 2006. According to the MIPT summary for 
GSPC, “The organization has operated since 1996 and is now the most significant terrorist 
movement in Algeria. The Salafist Group for Call and Combat broke off from the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA), which was the primary terrorist entity during the 1992-2000 insurgency in Algeria.”[8] 
As a result, our GSPC research utilized the date, January 1, 1996, as the initial search timeframe 
for source material. Initial review of the MIPT database identified 16 incidents attributable to 
GSPC from January 1, 1996 through December 31, 2006 (last day of the search was May 25, 
2006). In an attempt to verify the data located in the MIPT database, internet searches were 
performed using Google and Yahoo search engines. The search results from these two avenues 
proved lacking and incomplete. A subsequent search utilizing the Open Source Center (OSC, 
formerly named the Foreign Broadcast Information Service)[9] was conducted. Search criteria 
included:  
1. Search variable = “GSPC” 
2. Search time frame = 1 Jan 96 through 31 Dec 2006 
The OSC search resulted in 2,430 hits or articles with GSPC mentioned within the text. Sorting 
the articles by year reveals the following breakout:  
1. 0 = GSPC hits for 1996 (1 January through 31 December 1996) 
2. 1 = 1997 - unrelated group in Libya, General Social Popular Command 
3. 3 = 1998 
4. 68 = 1999 
5. 215 = 2000 
6. 322 = 2001 
7. 398 = 2002 
8. 363 = 2003 
9. 443 = 2004 
10. 406 = 2005 
11. 211 = 2006 (end date of May 25, 2006) 
Interestingly, according to OSC article FTS19981207001 641 Algiers La Tribune (Internet version) 
in French December 7, 1998, GSPC was established in 1998 with its first communiqué. This 
appears to have been validated by Abu Omar Abdul Bir, chief representative of the Media Wing of 
the GSPC who remarked during an interview with Al-Faath Magazine, “The GSPC was first 
established at the end of 1419 Hijri [1998].”[10] This information and the deficit of OSC regional 
GSPC articles in 1996 and 1997 refute several sources, to include MIPT, which place the initial 
inception of the group sometime in 1996.  
Although the veracity of the information and sources contained within the articles received from 
the OSC search may be questioned, our research was buttressed by OSC’s mission: to provide 
“foreign media reporting and analysis to policymakers, government institutions and strategic 
partners. We deliver targeted, timely and authoritative open source intelligence for analysis, 
operations and policymaking.”[11] As such, OSC should prove credible and provide the raw data 
needed to gather the initial data about GSPC operations from 1996-2006.  
While reviewing the 2,430 articles, several quality control measures were adopted to ensure 
sound data collection.  
1. As stated earlier, the original intention for searching out other sources of GSPC operations was 
to verify the data contained within the MIPT database of the group’s incidents. This goal was 
maintained and broadened. To validate MIPT’s GSPC incidents and classify specifically what 
incidents they were attributing to GSPC, we attempted to validate the verbiage from MIPT within 
articles from OSC. This proved a very useful tool, as 8 of 16 incidents were found within articles 
that the OSC search yielded. Additionally, the criteria that MIPT was inferentially counting as 
incidents (targets = government, civilians, police, tourists, etc. and tactics = assassination, 
kidnapping, armed attack, bombing, etc.) were the same that we utilized during our review of the 
OSC articles. 
2. A complete review of every article was not possible. As a result, the title and two line review of 
each article provided by OSC was proofed to determine operational GSPC content. When 
operational content or mention of a GSPC-specific mission was noted, a complete reading of the 
article was conducted to gather pertinent information. Note: By not reviewing every article in its 
entirety, operational data will not be 100% accurate—there are other operations that are not 
reflected because they were embedded in other non-operations-related articles that were not 
readily obvious during the review noted above. Some operations may not have been reported, 
and the veracity of the data presented in the translated articles may be questionable. While we 
tried to catch all the data, the time constraints and large number of articles were a detractor. 
Sources being referenced in the OSC articles may have been incorrect as well. 
3. A distinction was made between GSPC operations and GSPC counterattacks and skirmishes 
with security forces. Only GSPC operations were considered. Counterattacks and skirmishes 
against security forces were not considered GSPC operations because they did not entail what 
we considered a terrorist attack or show initiative on their part for the incident. 
4. While reviewing each article, we noted that although the article may allude to an operation, 
further study of its content revealed an operation which was attributable to no group. GSPC was 
mentioned in the article as an aside and reminder to the reading public of past actions the group 
may have conducted or just as a reminder of their presence in the region where the unattributed 
operation occurred. Only operations which could be directly attributable to GSPC, its affiliates, or 
group members (for example, some articles state that Hattab and his following conducted the 
attack—Hattab was a GSPC zone Emir and later head of GSPC) were considered and coded as 
“GSPC”; all others were coded as “Unnamed.” 
5. In order to maintain continuity of GSPC’s operational tactic, the actual tactic specified by each 
article was used. Although some tactics appear to be something else (incursion appears to be an 
armed attack), the article’s specification was used versus our interpretation of the operation. In 
addition, for any operation which utilized two or more tactics, the originating tactic was recorded. 
6. Any operations in Europe or Algeria that were not consummated or at the very least begun 
prior to government intervention were not counted. Many times arrests were made in Europe prior 
to the start of an operation. Because we don’t know if the operation would have occurred, it is not 
counted as a completed or in-progress operation (example, the GSPC-proposed operation 
against the U.S. Embassy in Paris—the operation was stopped at the planning stages [reference 
OSC article—GMP20020721000009 Algiers Le Mat Version-WWW in Internet 21 Jul 02]). 
7. When operations were conducted with multiple “Devices,” the device that inflicted the initial 
damage (for example, explosion at a roadblock then assassination of those left using a knife), 
was recorded as the device (explosion) used. 
8. Duplicate entries from different sources within OSC were eliminated checking location, 
situational data, and timeframe. Numerous articles referred to GSPC operations that occurred 
days, weeks, months or years in the past. These operations were noted and then double-checked 
when the appropriate time was reviewed. If the original course material could be found to confirm 
the operation, it was recorded with both the original and future text source line. If no operation 
could be found in the past, the future reference was used and recorded. 
9. A review of the 2,430 articles was conducted in its entirety twice. The first review was 
chronological; the second was reverse chronological. 
While reviewing the articles and noting the massive amounts of data that could be pulled from 
each article, an Excel tracking database (available through Dr. Tom Johnson, NPS) was created 
to log in the operational information and compile the results in tables and charts (using Excel’s 
pivot tables and charts). The original database fields/column headings that were utilized to log 
information pulled from the OSC articles were:  
1. Date = Date of operation  
2. Location = Location of operation  
3. Operation = Exact verbiage from the OSC article about the operation and its 
attribution  
4. Tactic = GSPC operation tactic to inflict harm or obtain resources  
5. Device = GSPC primary device used during operation (knife, firearms, explosives, 
etc.)  
6. Target = primary target of GSPC operation  
7. Country = country where operation occurred  
8. Ideological phrases at the time  
9. Number of Members in GSPC  
10. Source = text source line from OSC or other sources used to easily identify the 
actual article from which the material came  
11. Database = where the “source” was located—MIPT, OSC, etc.  
During the initial review and data capture from the OSC articles, several additional fields were 
added to the database to provide for greater continuity, information visibility and future data 
compilation. The additional fields include:  
1. Day, Month, Year, Quarter breakout – Quarters are calendar year 
2. GSPC or Unnamed = as discussed earlier, operations mentioned in articles may not have been 
attributable to GSPC. During the second review of the 2,430 articles it was determined to include 
all operations found when OSC search “GSPC” was conducted. The need to differentiate 
between GSPC and unattributable or “unnamed” operations emerged. 
3. Weather (temperature), Temperature Range, Weather (rain), Rain Range = fields identifying 
environmental conditions during operation. These fields were used to test hypotheses about 
operational constraints attributable to weather. 
4. Region = Algeria is a country made up of hundreds if not thousands of villages, communes and 
cities. The original “location” attribution proved to be too broad and unmanageable with over 100 
villages and cities cited as the location of the operations. OSC articles many times not only cited 
cities but also the region or wilaya (province of administrative jurisdiction) within which the city 
falls. (Algeria is made up of 48 wilayas—most are densely located in the northern portion of the 
country—see Appendix 1.) Region was added to assist in compiling operational data of the 
hundreds of cities and villages. 
5. Coordinates, GEO Coord precision, Distance from Epicenter (km), Ranged Distance from 
Epicenter (km) = If the location associated with the geographic coordinates (GEO COORD) had a 
different spelling from the location in OSC, the geographic coordinates of the operational location 
were included to aid in building graphical and events-driven representations of the operations. 
Geographic coordinates were determined based on the “Location” data. Additionally, for those 
locations without precise geographic coordinates, an approximation was taken from closest city, 
region, or other information obtained from the OSC article. Epicenter data was created to assist in 
validating the geographic coordinates and proofing the data with the location, and with hypothesis 
validation of distance from the attack epicenter. Finally, many times the location data contained 
within OSC was incongruous with the spellings used in the geographic coordinate websites or 
other in country sites used to validate names of cities and villages and match them with region or 
wilaya. Sites to determine geographic coordinates, epicenter, and city/wilaya validation included:  
a. GEO Coords: Multimap located here.  
b. GEO Coords: Falling rain located at: http://www .fallingrain.com/world/AG/index.html  
c. Epicenter data: Distance from Epicenter was found by using GEO coords 36 42 26N and 003 
46 25E (in the middle of the majority of operations) and then using GEO coord for the incident 
location: http://www.movable-type.co.uk/scripts/LatLong.html  
d. City/wilaya validation: http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alg%C3%A9rie 
6. Tactic Outcome = Grouping created to assist in data compilation and hypothesis validation. 
Labeling of operations tactic outcome was done subjectively by reviewing the main target and 
specific operational data contained within each article. 
7. Tactic Outcome Grouping = Created to provide an easier sorting and data analysis of the 
operations. Those operations that garnered resources (except when harm against the 
government was a byproduct), preaching, and kidnapping were grouped as a Resources 
operation, regardless of any dual purpose as annotated in Tactic Outcome, i.e. 
resource/preaching. Government resource tactic outcome was grouped under “Government 
Resources.” Those operations that resulted in destruction, bombings, and resource/harm 
(government) were grouped under Harm. Civilian harm tactic was grouped “Civilian Harm.” A 
review of the Resources/Harm data for both civilian and government targets reveals that the 
majority of the time this double grouping falls in line with the hypothesis: if aimed at civilians, the 
operation started as resource (grouping) and ended with resource and harm; harm was the 
byproduct of some additional circumstance. Likewise, government operations shown as 
resources/harm began as harm. 
8. Civilian or “Government” Grouping = Grouping created to assist in data compilation and 
hypothesis validation. Civilian is defined as any noncombatant not associated with the local, 
regional, or federal government of Algeria or affiliated, either past or present, with GSPC. 
“Government” is everyone else. Specifically, Government includes:  
a. Militia = Municipal Guard, “Armed Civilians,” Legitimate Defense Group (GLD), Patriots  
b. Army, Soldiers, National People Army (NAP)  
c. Government officials = Mayor, customs agents, etc.  
d. “Repentants” = GSPC members that surrendered during one of the two amnesty periods 
offered by the Algerian government  
e. Police 
9. Civilian Injured, Killed, Abducted and “Government” Injured, Killed, Abducted = Created to 
capture the total human toll of the operation and to assist in data compilation and hypothesis 
validation. 
After all relevant articles were reviewed and pertinent data extracted and logged into the 
database, tables and graphs were constructed to represent the data pictorially and begin 
hypothesis validation. Contained within the database are a series of graphs and tables that were 
initially used to provide insight into the operations of GSPC. All graphs are tabbed red. While 
these represent many of the hypotheses we will be testing, they are not all inclusive. Additional 
data and hypotheses can and should be tested. These areas will be reviewed at the end of the 
paper.  
Finally, in an attempt to extract as much information as possible from the OSC articles, additional 
spreadsheets were created to compile data that either is useful for this current project but not 
applicable for the main spreadsheet, or has no current application for the project but is helpful 
information that can be used for future research. These spreadsheets include:  
1. U.S. Interest Data = GSPC verbiage and information from OSC articles aimed at 
U.S. interests  
2. European GSPC Rhetoric Data = GSPC Rhetoric obtained from European sources 
either aimed at U.S. or European interests  
3. European Arrest/Failed Ops Data = GSPC arrests within Europe or failed GSPC 
operations aimed directly at but not operationalized within Europe  
4. GSPC Statements = General helpful GSPC rhetoric  
5. Key Dates and Articles = Additional dates and articles containing GSPC-specific 
information that might be helpful for future research  
Additional Analytical Considerations 
Certain variables may correlate, but their causal relationship may be direct or second-order 
relationships. For example, if the data suggest roadblocks occur during the day rather than at 
night, it may be the direct result of the GSPC’s inability to operate at night, or it may be because 
tourists/civilian (shakedown targets) travel predominantly during the day (an indirect, second 
order causal relationship, where the daylight directly affects the tourists, whose resultant behavior 
then affects the GSPC’s behavior). In this case, the data was unrefined to determine time of day.  
Sources may be biased or misleading, but in the absence of evidence to suggest a given piece of 
data was erroneous, we treated it as true. GSPC statements, though framed as rhetoric and 
propaganda, were taken at face value. If the GSPC claimed to have participated in an attack, it 
was taken at its word, even though there was the possibility the GSPC was merely “jumping on 
the bandwagon” ex post facto of a successful attack perpetrated by an allied terrorist group. 
Likewise, government statements were also taken as factual, even though the Government of 
Algeria has an incentive to characterize skirmishes as engagements with GSPC. (David Gutelius 
from Stanford University has asserted in general the government of Algeria has labeled 
skirmishes with bandits as encounters with GSPC to inflate the level of GSPC presence, activity 
and threat;[12] however, without contradictory data concerning a specific incident, individual 
reports of GSPC activity were treated as accurate. The general assertion that government of 
Algeria reports might be inflated could only serve to lower the confidence of the overall data set, 
and thus could not be used to eliminate any individual report.)  
One should note that GSPC operations are sometimes staged with branching options to harm or 
provide resources (e.g., road blocks set up for dual purpose to take advantage of targets of 
opportunity: government forces that encounter the roadblock are ambushed [harm], while civilian 
travelers are shaken down for money or kidnapped for ransom [resources]). Logistical operations, 
such as materiel movement, arms purchases, or smuggling did not fit the category of actual 
operations used in this study. Criminal enterprises (like fraud, narcotics trafficking, etc.) that did 
not involve direct coercive actions against victims (like roadblocks, shakedowns or ransom 
kidnappings) also did not fit the category.  
Operations were examined in two contexts. They were either domestic operations within Algeria 
or external (cross-border or transnational) operations into neighboring Northwest African 
countries or Europe. Unfortunately, most of the data available credited the GSPC for attacks 
within Algeria. Sources attributed a few external attacks in neighboring countries to GSPC, but 
they were limited. Furthermore, it appears the GSPC-linked Algerians arrested in European 
counterterrorism operations were involved in external support activities, such as document 
forgery or personnel smuggling; none of their activities fit the operational categories used in this 
study. Incursions into population areas were considered operations against civilians unless 
specific statements pointed to a government target.  
Rhetoric was derived from public statements. These included GSPC communiqués (normally 
posted on their website) and statements made by GSPC officials in media interviews. Rhetoric 
was qualified as primarily for external or internal (GSPC member) audiences. (Though statements 
may be intended for both internal and external consumption, the primary audience was the 
qualifying factor.) Statements linked directly to an operation, such as claims of responsibility or 
warning of specific upcoming attack, were so earmarked. 
Anticipated Analytical Outcomes and Hypotheses  
Operations versus Population Density 
• Hypothesis: Sustainment (resources) and attack (harm) operations will correlate 
with population density.  
Operations versus Distance from Epicenter 
• Hypothesis: GSPC operates in areas of reduced government control, where they 
may capitalize on rugged, inhospitable terrain to develop a home-court advantage. 
Such areas include the Sahel region that cuts across southern Algeria. Roadblocks 
will occur within an identifiable range from population centers—far enough away 
from areas of government control, but close enough to catch targeted traffic of 
sufficient frequency (“lions at the watering hole” effect).  
Locations versus Operations over Time 
• Hypothesis: A shift in regional activity is expected over time, i.e., the 
concentration of GSPC operations would shift geographically as GSPC ceded 
capability in some areas while gaining more capability and interest in others.  
Operations and Tactics versus Month and Quarter 
• Hypothesis: GSPC operations and tactics are influenced by social, political, and 
environmental occurrences. Examples include: Ramadan, political elections, etc.  
Correlate Rhetoric with Victim Type by Using Percentage of Civilian versus Government 
Victims 
• Hypothesis: According to rhetoric GSPC split from GIA because the former 
targeted civilians for death/injury. GSPC is not inclined to kill/injure civilians.  
Correlate Sustainment Operations to Algerian Amnesty Programs (1999 Civil Concord 
Restoration Act, 2005 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation Act) 
• Hypothesis: According to rhetoric from articles on GSPC, as amnesty programs 
were expiring there was an increase in the number of money-making (resource) 
operations targeting civilians (roadblocks, kidnappings, incursions) to raise funds 
before members opted for amnesty. 
• Hypothesis: According to rhetoric from articles on GSPC, announcement of 
amnesty programs spurred an increase in the number of attacks (harm) on 
“government” entities.  
Weather versus Operations and Tactics 
• Hypothesis: Operations occur more frequently during periods of temperate 
weather.  
Descriptive Analysis of Hypotheses 
Operations versus Population Density 
One might expect GSPC operations to be more frequent in areas where there is a greater 
concentration of potential victims. Since most Algerians reside in the fertile band along the 
northern coast, it comes as no surprise the attacks predominate in the north (see Figure IV-A1). 
Table IV-A1 shows the geographic surface area,[13] population[14] and population density for the 
wilayas in the study.[15]  
Figure IV-A1: Population Distribution (1971)  
 
Source: University of Texas-Austin 



















Adrar  464900 311615 0.670283932 0.67 
Algiers  273 2562428 9386.18315 9386 
Annaba  1412 557818 395.0552408 395 
Batna  12028 962623 80.03184237 80 
Bejaia  3329 856840 257.3866026 257 
Biskra  21671 575858 26.57274699 26.6 
Blida  1541 784283 508.9441921 508.9 
Bouira  4517 629560 139.3756918 139 
Boumerdes  1558 647389 415.5256739 415.5 
Constantine  2288 810914 354.4204545 354 
Djelfa  29035 797706 27.47394524 27.5 
Jijel  2399 573208 238.9362234 238.9 
Medea  8700 802078 92.19287356 92.2 
M'sila  18447 805519 43.66666667 43.7 
Relizane  4840 642205 132.6869835 132.6 
Setif  6504 1311413 201.6317651 201.6 
Skikda  4137 786154 190.0299734 190 
Tamanrasset  556000 137175 0.246717626 0.25 
Tebessa  13878 549066 39.56377 39.6 
Tissemsilt  3151 264240 83.85909235 83.9 
Tizi Ouzou  2993 1108708 370.4336786 370 
The attack concentration roughly follows the population density in so much as it settles in this 
band, but it does not correlate precisely with numerical population density by wilaya. Figures IV-
A2 and IV-A3 compare the population density with the cumulative attacks between 1998-2006. 
(For attack data by Region, see section C. Locations versus Operations over Time, Table IV-C1.) 
The data for Algiers (population density 9386 people/sq km) skews the graph in Figure IV-A2, as 
its density far exceeds that of any other city—making the capital province 18 times denser than 
the second-densest wilaya, Blida. Figure IV-A3 excludes the Algiers data, thereby opening up the 
distribution along the x-axis for easier viewing.  
Algiers 
Figure IV-A2: Attacks vs. Population Density  
 Figure IV-A3: Attacks vs. Population Density  
 
Table IV-A2: Population Density and Cumulative Attacks  
 Table-IVA2 depicts the raw data for population density and cumulative attacks between 1998 and 
May 2006. The concentration of GSPC attacks roughly follows the population density, but the 
correlation does not appear to be strong. Absent rigorous statistical analysis, the precise degree 
(coefficient) of correlation cannot be ascertained.  
Figure IV-A4 depicts the 1998-2006 (through May) cumulative total of attacks on a population 
density map. 
Figure IV-A4: Cumulative Attacks (1998-2006) vs. Population Density (Map View)  
 Base map source: CETMO 
Operations versus Distance from Epicenter 
The clustering of attacks around Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou could be attributed to a number of 
factors, of which little data are available in this specific study. The two wilayas may simply offer a 
greater number of attractive targets, based on population density, degree of government security 
forces control (or lack thereof), or proximity to GSPC bases of operations (like the one in the 
mountains near Beni Amrane, just over 20 km east of the city of Boumerdes). Regardless of the 
reasons, the clustering invites examination of the concentration of attacks as a function of 
distance from some central point.  
The simplest method to designate an “epicenter” for the attack distribution was to bisect the line 
connecting the cities of Bourmerdes and Tizi Ouzou. This served as an arbitrary anchor point 
between the two cities and equidistant to them both. (The epicenter is not the same as the 
geographic center of all attacks, which would take into account attacks and their geographic 
locations to determine the weighted average on a planar space.) The epicenter was fixed at 36º 
42’ 26” N, 003º 46’ 25” E, on the northern coast approximately 60 km east of the capital Algiers. 
Attacks were then charted based on their linear distance from this epicenter, without regard to 
their direction from the epicenter. Thus, an attack 50 km east of the epicenter would be grouped 
with another attack 50 km west of the epicenter.  
When sources gave precise geographic coordinates for an attack location, they were used to 
determine distance from the epicenter; otherwise, the coordinates for the closest city were 
employed. Attacks without good location information were excluded from the distance evaluation. 
Each incident thus was associated with two pieces of data: (1) its region (wilaya) and (2) its 
distance from the epicenter, or “epidistance.” Table IV-B1 categorizes the attacks in each wilaya 
according to their epidistance. For example, of the seven attacks in Algiers wilaya (Wilaya 
d’Alger), one was between 20 and 40 km from the epicenter, two were between 40 and 60 km, 
and four were between 60 and 80 km from the epicenter.  
Table IV-B1: Attack Epidistance  
 
Figure IV-B1a charts the number of attacks by region and as a function of linear distance from the 
epicenter (epidistance). Figure IV-B1b plots the epidistance distribution on a line graph. 
Figure IV-B1a: Accumulation of Attacks by Epidistance and Region  
 Figure IV-B1b: Distribution of Attacks by Epidistance  
 
The distribution shows that most attacks occur within 80 km of the epicenter, with a smaller 
clustering in the 200-350 km range. Overall, the general trend shows a decline in GSPC attacks 
as distance increases from the epicenter. Possible contributing factors are merely a matter of 
conjecture at this point. The location of GSPC sub-element bases of operation, the population 
density, or degree of control by government security forces may each contribute in some fashion 
to the aggregation of attacks. Further research and analysis may be able to uncover possible 
independent or intervening variables that engender such clustering. 
Locations versus Operations over Time 
Tizi Ouzou Wilaya suffered the first attack attributed to GSPC in 1998. This was the only attack 
GSPC perpetrated that year, introducing Tizi Ouzou as the GSPC’s “leading victim.” Boumerdes 
joined the list of victims in 1999 with 7 attacks, while Tizi Ouzou saw another 13 that year. The 
two regions together led the country for GSPC incidents from that point forward. From the very 
beginning, no other wilaya ever came close to matching Boumerdes or Tizi Ouzou in reported 
GSPC incidents. Most of the incidents were concentrated in the northern portion of Algeria. 
Figure IV-C1 shows the region. Table IV-C1 lists the incidents by wilaya per year. 
GSPC Operations  
Figure IV-C1: Northern Algeria 
 
Table IV-C1: Attacks by Wilaya per Year 
Region  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Grand 
Total  
Adrar  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Algiers  0 0 0 1 3 1 1 2 0 8 
Annaba  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Batna  0 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 0 10 
Bejaia  0 0 1 2 1 2 0 3 0 9 
Biskra  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Blida  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Bouira  0 1 2 11 6 3 4 3 0 30 
Boumerdes  0 7 11 21 32 24 32 26 18 171 
Constantine  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Djelfa  0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 5 
Foreign  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Jijel  0 0 3 2 3 2 1 8 0 19 
Medea  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
M'sila  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 
Relizane  0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 
Setif  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Skikda  0 0 3 2 1 3 3 3 1 16 
Tamanrasset  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Tebessa  0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Tissemsilt  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Tizi Ouzou  1 13 10 13 35 14 7 5 1 99 
Unknown  0 0 1 3 2 1 2 3 1 13 
Grand Total  1 23 35 61 87 54 56 66 22 405 
Figures IV-C2 through IV-C10 show the accumulation of incidents by location, year-by-year, in 
both bar graph format and on the map: 
Figure IV-C2a and IV-C2b: GSPC Cumulative Attacks, 1998  
 Figure IV-C3a: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-1999 
 Figure IV-C3b: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-1999 (Map View) 
 
Figure IV-C4a: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2000 
 Figure IV-C4b: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2000 (Map View) 
 
Figure IV-C5a: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2001 
 Figure IV-C5b: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2001 (Map View) 
 
Figure IV-C6a: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2002 
 Figure IV-C6b: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2002 (Map View) 
 
Figure IV-C7a: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2003 
 Figure IV-C7b: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2003 (Map View) 
 
Figure IV-C8a: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2004 
 Figure IV-C8b: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2004 (Map View) 
 
Figure IV-C9a: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2005 
 Figure IV-C9b: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2005 (Map View) 
 
Figure IV-C10b: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2006 (Map View) 
 
GSPC Cumulative Attacks by Year: 1998-2006 
Figure IV-C11: Cumulative Attacks, 1998-2006 (Additive Columns) 
 
Figure IV-C11 graphs the attack accumulation using additive columns that break down the 
increase by year. Two regions clearly stand out as favored areas for operations: Boumerdes and 
Tizi Ouzou. The concentration in these two regions, whose respective capitals are 42 km apart, 
encourages comparison. 
Two Top Targets: Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou 
Tizi Ouzou led the country in the cumulative number of reported attacks through 2000, with 
Boumerdes coming in second. The following year, Boumerdes overtook Tizi Ouzou in cumulative 
reported attacks, reaching a total of 39 to Tizi Ouzou’s thirty-seven. Comparatively, their 
cumulative totals were even, and stayed fairly even through 2002, with Boumerdes totaling 71 
attacks while Tizi Ouzou inched ahead to 72 operations. Thenceforth, Boumerdes sustained far 
more attacks than Tizi Ouzou each year, and by 2006 Boumerdes had suffered a total of 171 
attacks to Tizi Ouzou’s ninety-nine. Table IV-C2 compares the accumulation of attacks in 
Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou.. 
Table IV-C2: Comparison of Attacks in Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou Wilayas 
Region  1998 1999  2000 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 2006 
Grand  
Total  
Boumerdes 0  7  11  21  32  24  32  26  18  171  
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The ratio of the number of attacks in Boumerdes to the number of attacks in Tizi Ouzou is 
reflected for each year, as well as for the cumulative total as of May 2006. The chart graphically 
depicts the annual ratio change over time in Figure IV-C12. 
Figure IV-C12: Ratio (Attacks in Boumerdes / Attacks in Tizi Ouzou) by Year 
 
Attacks in Boumerdes began increasingly to overtake those in Tizi Ouzou in 2003 (following a 
slight dip in 2002 when Tizi Ouzou endured more attacks). The reason for the increasing shift to 
targets in Boumerdes cannot be conclusively determined from the available data, but one might 
conjecture about the contribution of the May 2003 earthquake in Bourmerdes. A magnitude 6.8 
earthquake, epicentered in Boumerdes Wilaya, struck on 21 May 2003. The cities most affected 
were Boumerdes, the provincial capital; Zenmouri; Thenia; Belouizdad; Rouiba; and Reghaia. 
Eastern parts of the national capital, Algiers, also sustained damage. The urban damage was 
described as severe, and of note, the police headquarters facility in Boumerdes was destroyed 
and listed as irreparable.[16] The first post-quake GSPC attack in Boumerdes occurred a week 
later, on 27 May. Apparently “[t]aking advantage of the situation of panic and anarchy triggered by 
the strong [earthquake] aftershock that had been recorded a half-hour previously in that region,” 
GSPC combatants assassinated a police officer on the outskirts of Zenmouri (16 km east of 
Boumerdes).[17] A cursory glance at the frequency of incidents before and after the quake does 
not suggest an increasing frequency immediately following the disaster. The long-term effects of 
the quake may have contributed to the greater incidence of attacks in the later months and years, 
since the police forces could expectedly have a reduced effectiveness resulting from (1) the loss 
of their facilities and (2) an anticipated shift in priorities to maintaining domestic order amidst the 
post-event chaos and reconstruction period (i.e., search and rescue, crowd and traffic control, 
looting suppression, etc.). 
Operations and Tactic versus Month and Quarter  
Operations data were sorted by month, quarter and year to highlight any patterns or trends. Table 
IV-D1 breaks-down the operations by year and month.  
Table IV-D1: Operations by Month, 1998-2006  
YEAR  MONTH  Total  YEAR  MONTH  Total  YEAR  MONTH  Total  
1999  January  0  2000  January  3  
   February  0     February  4  
   March  0     March  2  
   April  0     April  6  
   May  0     May  1  
   June  0     June  2  
   July  1     July  3  
   August  7     August  2  
   September  5     September  1  
   October  0     October  4  
   
   November  3     November  2  
1998  
December  1     December  6     December  5  
Total     1  Total     23  Total     35  
                           
January  4  2002  January  6  2003  January  5  
February  1     February  5     February  1  
March  3     March  3     March  7  
April  8     April  7     April  2  
May  1     May  6     May  5  
June  3     June  4     June  7  
July  0     July  4     July  6  
2001  
August  2     August  6     August  1  
September  9     September  14     September  13  
October  8     October  11     October  2  
November  11     November  10     November  1  
December  11     December  11     December  4  
Total     61  Total     87  Total     54  
                  
2004  January  4  2005  January  6  2006  January  5  
   February  4     February  2     February  3  
   March  6     March  3     March  3  
   April  9     April  2     April  6  
   May  8     May  4     May  5  
   June  4     June  6  2006 Total  22  
   July  3     July  4  Grand Total  405  
   August  9     August  5           
   September  2     September  13           
   October  2     October  7           
   November  2     November  4           
   December  3     December  10           
Total     56  Total     66           
Table IV-D2 groups operations by month across all years, i.e., all attacks within a given calendar 
month each year were categorized in that month. Figure IV-D1 depicts the data as a bar graph. 
Table IV-D2: GSPC Operations by Calendar Month, Quarter  





January  33  
February  20  
1  
   March  27  
80  
   
April  40  
May  31  
2  
   June  26  
97  
   
July  21  
August  32  
3  
   September  57  
110  
   
October  34  
November  33  
4  
   December  51  
118  
   
Grand Total  405  405  
Figure IV-D1: GSPC Operations by Calendar Month, Quarter  
 Greater refinement shows the specific tactic used in each operation, against calendar month, as 
in Figure IV-D2.  
  
Figure IV-D2: Tactics by Calendar Month  
 The graph shows a slightly higher incidence of GSPC operations during the last two quarters of 
each calendar year. Refining the criteria further, GSPC tactics are segregated into attack (harm) 
and sustainment (resource) operations.[18] Figure IV-D3a graphs attack operations by tactic, 
while Figure X3b depicts sustainment tactics.  
Figure IV-D3a: Attack Tactics by Calendar Month  
 Figure IV-D3b: Sustainment Tactics by Calendar Month  
 
The data suggest GSPC conducts more roadblocks in the latter half of the calendar year, and that 
roadblocks appear to be the most common tactic. This is not surprising, since roadblocks are 
easy to set up and can serve a dual purpose. They primarily serve to acquire money and supplies 
(sustainment/resource), but in the event government personnel, such as off-duty militia or police 
officers, come across the roadblock, the GSPC can murder them (attack/harm). The high 
incidence of shakedowns in December is notable, but its significance cannot be determined from 
the data. (One might speculate as to whether the GSPC ties shakedowns to “alms” collections 
around Ramadan.)  
Target by Month 
Specific target types can be examined against the calendar year, as shown in Figure IV-D4. It 
becomes readily apparent that civilians are the primary target, followed by the military and civil 
militia. What is noteworthy is very few tourists were targeted (although tourists may be grouped 
with generic civilians if news reports do not identify them specifically as tourists). Operations 
against civilians[19] appear to rise during the latter third of the calendar year, while attacks on 
soldiers and militia appear relatively consistent throughout the year.  
Figure IV-D4: Targets by Calendar Month  
 
Figures IV-D5a and IV-D5b graph attacks against soldiers specifically and against security forces 
in general (excluding coast guard).  
Figure IV-D5a: Soldiers Targeted by Calendar Month 
 Figure IV-D5b: Security Forces Targeted by Calendar Month  
 
Correlate Rhetoric with Victim Type by Using Percentage of Civilian versus 
Government Victims 
GSPC and expert opinion attempt to correlate GSPC rhetoric with attacks against civilians and 
government resources. Since the inception of GSPC, the group espoused a desire to conduct 
operations against government assets and eschewed attacks which brought the death of innocent 
civilians. Is this the case?  
From the outset, the number of operations against civilians, while not significantly less than those 
against the government, was less per year. 
Table IV-E1: Comparison of GSPC Operations Between Government and Civilian 
Groupings 
Civilian or "Government" 
Grouping  YEAR  
Count of Civilian or "Government" 
Grouping  
Civilian     173  
   1999  7  
   2000  9  
   2001  24  
   2002  50  
   2003  24  
   2004  18  
   2005  29  
   2006  12  
         
Government     231  
   1999  16  
   2000  26  
   2001  37  
   2002  37  
   2003  30  
   2004  38  
   2005  37  
   2006  10  
         
Grand Total     404  
At first glance this paints an incomplete picture and provides for the assumption that the group 
targets civilians with similar effort to that of government officials. This would be incorrect. A review 
of the rhetoric does not preclude the group from conducting operations against civilians. The 
primary stricture is the wanton killing of civilians. A review of the operational tactic breakout 
provides some additional insight into the exact nature and division of operations GSPC conducts 
against civilian versus government targets.  
Figure IV-E1: GSPC Operational Tactic versus Target  
 A quick glance at the tactic versus target data quickly reveals that while operationally the 
numbers of incidents against civilians and government are close, the natures of the tactics are 
quite different.  
Civilians (civilian, tourists, and imams) are targeted for resource-specific missions (money, 
firearms, food, and other supplies). Roadblocks, incursions, shakedowns, and kidnappings are all 
predominantly money and resource generating activities. The government (all other designations) 
on the other hand is targeted for harm and destruction types of operations. Assassinations, 
ambushes, bombings, and destruction all result in harm to government officials or damage to their 
property. 
Figure IV-E2: GSPC Operational Tactic Outcome and Target Type  
 To prove this point, the following chart (Figure IV-E2) illustrates the tactic outcome against 
government and civilian targets. Note the inverse proportionality of harm versus resource for both 
civilian and government operations. Where operations against civilians generate more resources, 
those against the government generate more harm. The ability to show this partially explains and 
validates GSPC’s contentions that they would conduct operations in a manner counter to GIA; 
they would concentrate on the avoidance of civilian casualties.  
With an operational understanding of GSPC regarding civilian and government targets, the next 
question to be explored to assist in validating this hypothesis and GSPC origination rhetoric is to 
link operations with actual casualties. The following table defines the number of civilian and 
government entities injured, killed, or abducted from 1998-2006.  







Roadblock  19  99  
Assassination  22  74  
Incursion  15  28  
Ambush  5  269  
Bombing  16  112  
Armed Attack  4  136  
Shakedown  2  0  
Kidnapping  54  0  
Destruction  0  11  
Theft  0  1  
Unknown  0  4  
Roadblock/kidnapping  1  0  
Grand Total  138  734  
Over the past eight years, GSPC has conducted operations that have resulted in the death or 
injury of civilians. Interestingly, when sorting within the database, 31 civilian deaths were the 
result of operations aimed at government forces. While reviewing the articles within OSC, another 
anomaly was identified. Many times while conducting incursions and roadblocks, GSPC would 
search the identity papers of the citizens they came into contact with. If it was discovered that the 
plain clothed civilian was in fact a military member or had served in any government service, they 
were summarily executed (OSC source = GMP20030707000010, Algiers Le Matin [Internet 
Version-WWW] in French 07 Jul 03 and GMP20050709380006, Algiers El Watan [Internet 
Version-WWW] in French 09 Jul 05). Many times members of the civilian population became 
entangled in an execution-style operation against the government and were killed as an ancillary 
incident (OSC source = GMP20020526000006, Algiers Le Mat Version-WWW) in [Internet 25 
May 02] and GMP20011105000014, Algiers Le Mat Version-WWW) in [Internet 05 Nov 01]). 
Graphically, these numbers are represented below. 
Figure IV-E3: GSPC Operational Tactic versus Harm 
 
From the data above, a misperception may arise concerning kidnappings. All of the kidnappings 
involve civilians, but very few resulted in injury or death. The breakout we utilized was to 
aggregate the operational data for each incident by injured, killed, and abducted. This grouping 
creates a skewed perception that civilians were killed and injured the most during kidnappings. 
This is incorrect. A drill down into kidnapping reveals the following:  
Figure IV-E4: GSPC Operational Tactic Outcome and Target Type  
 
   
The pie chart shows the number of operations (17) that led to the 54 civilians being kidnapped. A 
review of those 17 operations and 54 civilians reveals one person (tourist) dying of heat stroke 
while a captive of GSPC. The seven unknown kidnappings did not have any follow-up report or 
additional information that would expound on whether or not the individual was returned. In sum, 
the number of civilian casualties up to this point has been limited.  
In order to finalize this hypothesis, a more succinct view of the harm data is required. Utilizing the 
pie charts below, a comparison is drawn between government and civilian tactical outcome by the 
GSPC. The side-by-side comparison (Figures IV-E5 and IV-E6) shows that the emphasis on 
resources against civilian targets validates the hypothesis expressing the desire to maintain low 
civilian casualty numbers while exacting a greater toll on government entities.  
Figure IV-E5: Civilian Harm Data 
 Figure IV-E6: Government Harm Data 
 
Correlate Sustainment Operations to Algerian Amnesty Programs (1999 
Civil Concord Restoration Act, 2005 Charter for Peace and National 
Reconciliation Act) 
The Algerian government has implemented a number of amnesty programs over the years to 
entice GSPC members to lay down their arms and reenter society. A brief overview of these two 
programs is included below:  
1999 Civil Concord Restoration Act = “Section 1 of the Civil Concord Restoration Act (Loi no 99 
08 du 29 Rabie el aouel 1420 correspondant au 13 juillet 1999 relative au rétablissement de la 
concorde civile) states that persons involved in terrorist actions who wish to end their criminal 
activities can expect to return to civilian life (Mission permanente n.d.b). Section 2 of the Act 
provides for three measures applicable to the individuals referred to in Section 1: exemption from 
prosecution, probation and reduction of sentences (Ibid.). Section 3 of the Act states that 
individuals who wish to avail themselves of this measure must surrender to the authorities by 13 
January 2000, that is within six months of the promulgation of the Act (Mission permanente n.d.b, 
s. 3). They must then notify the authorities that they are putting an end to their terrorist or 
subversive activities (Ibid.). Exemption from prosecution is accorded to persons who, although 
they have belonged to a terrorist organization referred to in the Criminal Code, have not 
[translation] ‘committed an offence [...] causing death or permanent disability of a human being or 
rape, and have not used explosives in public places or places frequented by the public’ (Ibid.), 
and to persons who have [translation] ‘held arms, explosives or other material means and have of 
their own free will surrendered them to the authorities’ (Ibid., s. 4). The second measure is 
probation for three to ten years (Mission permanente n.d.b, s. 12). Individuals are not eligible for 
probation if they [translation] ‘have committed, or have participated in the commission of, crimes 
involving the death of human beings, collective massacres, attacks with explosives in public 
places or places frequented by the public, or rape’ (Ibid., s. 7). Those who wish to avail 
themselves of this measure must surrender to the government within six months of the 
promulgation of the Act, and they must be prepared to join the struggle against terrorism (Mission 
permanente n.d.b, s. 27). The third measure provided for by the Act is a reduction of sentences 
for persons who [translation] ‘have reported of their own free will to the appropriate authorities 
within a period of three months from the date of promulgation of this Act, who have not been 
admitted to the probation plan and have not committed collective massacres or used explosives 
in public places or places frequented by the pubic [...]’ (Ibid., s. 27).”[20] 
2005 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation Act = “Extinction of legal proceedings for all 
the people who put an end to their armed activities and report themselves to the authorities. 
Withdrawal of legal proceedings against people wanted in Algeria or abroad or sentenced in 
absentia and who will decide to report themselves voluntarily to the authorities. Grant of pardon 
for people who have been sentenced or detained for terrorist actions other than collective 
slaughters, rapes and attacks with explosives in public places. Commutations or reduction in 
sentences for all other individuals who are definitively sentenced, detained or wanted for terrorist 
actions and who are not covered by the above mentioned grant of pardon and extinction of penal 
proceedings. The charter project provides for prohibition of exercise of all political activity 
whatsoever for people responsible of this kind of instrumentation of religion. Prohibition of any 
political activity for anyone who had a part of responsibility in conception and implementation of 
the policy that advocated the pseudo ‘djihad’ against the nation and the institutions of the 
Republic. The State will act as a substitute in responsibility for the lot of all the people who 
disappeared in the framework of the national tragedy. The State will take the right measures in 
order to allow the beneficiaries of the disappeared people to transcend this great hardship with 
dignity. The disappeared will be considered as victims of the national tragedy et [sic] their 
beneficiaries will have a right of compensation.”[21] 
GSPC does not support Algerian amnesty programs and have called for the increased attacks on 
government forces in opposition to the programs. Additionally, Algerian rhetoric promotes the 
assumption that as amnesty programs expire, GSPC operations turn more towards sustainment 
and resource collection activities. The concept promotes the idea that, prior to ending their 
terrorist career, GSPC members attempt to amass as many resources as possible. 
(GMP20060502380001, Algiers El Watan [Internet Version-WWW] in French, 02 May 06.)  
The following chart displays by calendar year and quarter GSPC operations targeted at civilians 
to raise resources. Other operations such as assassinations, destruction, and preaching have 
been removed as they are not resource generating and do not apply to this hypothesis. A similar 
government chart is not shown, because as discussed in Section E, civilians were the main target 
for resource generating operations.  
Figure IV-F1: Civilian Resource Generating Operations 
 
Noting that the 1999 Civil Concord Restoration Act expired on 13 January 2000 and the 2005 
Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation may expire February, March or June 2006[22], 
there is little evidence to conclude that GSPC operations increased toward resource generating 
activities. In order to show more conclusively a shift in operations, a review of civilian resources 
versus government harm operations over time needs to be conducted to determine if GSPC 
moved away from harm activities to resource operations. The following chart (Figure IV-F2) 
provides the data concerning both operations.  
Figure IV-F2: Civilian Resource versus Government Harm Operations  
 Reviewing the time period leading up to and including January 1999 and February, March, and 
June 2006, the validation of the hypothesis describing increased sustainment and resource 
generating activities as the expiration date of the amnesty programs approached is not 
achievable. Understanding that GSPC has finite manpower to conduct operations, orchestrating 
both resource generating and harm operations isn’t likely. As a result, if the hypothesis were 
correct, the data should reveal an increase in resource operations in and leading up to the 
expiration months, and a decrease in harm operations.  
The data in Figure IV-F2 shows the opposite for the 1999 Act with resource operations declining 
and harm operations decreasing in the months approaching January 1999 then increasing shortly 
thereafter. The decrease, then increase, in government harm operations provide some insight 
into possible effects of the amnesty program close to the expiration date: GSPC members were 
taking amnesty under the program, thus reducing manpower and the will to conduct operations by 
members, but it does not conclusively validate the hypothesis for resource operations.  
Depending on the actual start and expiration dates for the 2006 Act, the data from 2006 more 
closely support the hypothesis than the data from the 1999 amnesty period. Government harm 
and civilian resource operations decrease through the first quarter of CY06 with resource 
operations increasing in the second quarter. Neither action successfully validates the hypothesis, 
however.  
Equally, the second hypothesis expecting an increase in government harm operations (conducted 
by GSPC in retaliation to the amnesty programs) is disproved by the same chart, Figure IV-F2. 
The months from the initial announcement (July 1999 and August 2005) until the expiration dates 
did not see an overall increase in operations. The opposite occurred.  
Although the first and second hypotheses are both invalidated, a counter-hypothesis can be 
posed. Interestingly, during the months from initial announcement of the amnesty programs (July 
1999 and August 2005), actual resource and harm operations decreased. It would appear that the 
amnesty programs may have had the opposite affect. Rather than increasing operations targeting 
government harm and civilian resources, operations decreased.            
Weather versus Operations and Tactics 
Table IV-G1: Tactics vs. Temperature (°C) 
 
Weather can expectedly impact GSPC operations. A terrorist group’s predilection for operating in 
certain types of weather conditions may lend insight into that organization’s capabilities or levels 
of “professionalization” as a paramilitary force. Elements that routinely operate in adverse 
weather conditions may demonstrate a robust military capability. Elements that appear to avoid 
operating in poor weather either (1) do not have the ability to function in adverse conditions or (2) 
do not have the desire to endure the discomfort. The first option points to capability, while the 
second reflects force professionalization. The precise temperature data can be grouped into 
temperature ranges, giving a better picture of GSPC operational patterns with respect to 
temperature. These patterns are depicted in Figure IV-G1. (Operations are not broken out by 
tactic in Figure IV-G1; all tactics are combined into total operations in the graph.)  
Weather information was sparse for the locations and dates of the specific operations. Therefore, 
the sampled data set was very small. Few definitive findings, if any, can be drawn from the data; 
but if one were to assume (a bold presumption) the inclusive data represent general GSPC 
operations, one might conclude GSPC operations tend to concentrate in two general temperature 
ranges as shown in Figure IV-G1: 15 to 20 degrees and 25 to 30 degrees Centigrade.  
Figure IV-G1: Distribution of Operations with Respect to Temperature (°C) 
 
Observations and Conclusions  
Hypothesis Validation  
Attacks versus Population Density 
• Hypothesis: Sustainment (resources) and attack (harm) operations will correlate 
with population density.  
• Conclusion: The data roughly supported this hypothesis, as operations generally 
concentrated in regions of higher population density. However, a difference in 
population density between two well populated regions within the northern 
coastal “population band” did not suggest the one with greater density would 
necessarily attract more GSPC attention. Nevertheless, both could expect greater 
GSPC activity than less populous regions in the southern three-quarters of the 
country.  
Attacks versus Distance from Epicenter  
• Hypothesis: GSPC operates in areas of reduced government control, where they 
may capitalize on rugged, inhospitable terrain to develop a home-court advantage. 
Such areas include the Sahel region that cuts across southern Algeria. Roadblocks 
will occur within an identifiable range from population centers—far enough away 
from areas of government control, but close enough to catch targeted traffic of 
sufficient frequency (“lions at the watering hole” effect).  
• Conclusion: The results were partially inconclusive. While the data did invalidate 
the assumption that the operations occurred in regions consistent with the Sahel, 
the data was not precise enough to determine how far individual operations were 
from areas of strong government control. For example, roadblocks could not be 
pinpointed to specific locations on isolated highways between urban centers. At 
best, the data showed a gradual decline in GSPC activity as a function of distance 
from the area of highest operational concentration (i.e., the Boumerdes-Tizi 
Ouzou corridor). The data did show that operations occurred primarily in the 
northern, more populously dense region.  
Locations versus Operations over Time  
• Hypothesis: A shift in regional activity is expected over time, i.e., the 
concentration of GSPC operations would shift geographically as GSPC ceded 
capability in some areas while gaining more capability and interest in others.  
• Conclusion: The data did not sustain this hypothesis. While certain areas saw 
increased GSPC activity over time, the initial areas of interest (Tizi Ouzou and 
Boumerdes) during the group’s formative years continued to receive the lion’s 
share of GSPC attention. At best, a subtle shift was observed as Boumerdes 
gradually wrested prominence from Tizi Ouzou as the GSPC’s favored area of 
operations; Boumerdes’ prominence increased dramatically after 2003.  
Operations and Tactic versus Month and Quarter  
• Hypothesis: GSPC operations and tactics are influenced by social, political, and 
environmental occurrences. Examples include: Ramadan, political elections, etc.  
• Conclusion: The data were inconclusive in correlating GSPC activity and external 
events. No appreciable increase in activity surrounded the national elections of 
April 1999 or April 2004. However, autumn showed heavier activity across the 
years, with noticeable spikes in September and December each year. At best, the 
heightened activity in December might be attributable to GSPC shakedowns and 
incursions to collect “alms” around Ramadan.  
Correlate Rhetoric with Victim Type by Using Percentage of Civilian versus Government 
Victims 
• Hypothesis: According to its own rhetoric, GSPC split from GIA because the 
former targeted civilians for death or injury. GSPC is not inclined to kill or injure 
civilians.  
• Conclusion: The data generally support a conclusion that Government targets 
comprised the bulk of casualties from GSPC operations (attack operations for 
harm), rather than civilians. Civilians were statistically more often victims of 
activities perpetrated for financial gain (sustainment operations for resources). 
However, specific GSPC rhetoric and statements did not correlate directly with 
operations with respect to target types. The GSPC issued a few claims of 
responsibility for attacks, and issued a few threats, but the data were too limited to 
foster solid conclusions.  
Correlate Sustainment Operations to Algerian Amnesty Programs (1999 Civil Concord 
Restoration Act, 2005 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation Act) 
• Hypothesis: According to anti-GSPC rhetoric in articles on GSPC, as amnesty 
programs were expiring there was an increase in the number of money-making 
operations targeting civilians (roadblocks, kidnappings, incursions) to raise funds 
before members opted for amnesty.  
• Conclusion: See below. 
• Hypothesis: According to rhetoric from articles on GSPC, announcement of 
amnesty programs spurred an increase in the number of attacks on “government” 
entities.  
• Conclusion: The data generally did not support this hypothesis. As amnesty 
periods drew to a close, one did not observe the expected rise in attacks (to 
dissuade defection or to punish repentants) and sustainment activities (to amass a 
nest egg prior to taking amnesty). Rather, both types of operations declined as the 
amnesty periods ran out.  
Weather versus Operations and Tactics 
• Hypothesis: Operations occur more frequently during periods of temperate 
weather.  
• Conclusion: The data was sparse and did not engender any firm conclusions. 
Activities concentrated in two temperature ranges, but the reason for the 
clustering is unknown. A full climatological study might offer further insight.  
General Observations 
1. Within OSC, often one article will discuss multiple operations. These incidents were split out as 
best as possible as separate operations. 
2. Operations may be complex. For example, GSPC implements a roadblock to shakedown 
civilians, but the operation is also a ploy (bait) to attract police or soldiers who are then ambushed 
when they respond to the roadblock (dual purpose operation). Thus, the incident consists of two 
distinct classes of operation; they are recorded as two separate operations because two they 
reflect separate intentions and targets. 
3. Roadblocks were used extensively to shakedown private citizens or assassinate/execute police, 
militia, patriots, guards and soldiers (dual purpose operation). 
4. It seems that GSPC generally regarded civilians as civilians, but if they have been tied in the 
past to the military, militia or government, then the person retains that distinction. A number of 
incursions, roadblocks and shakedowns involved identification checks. Once a member’s 
affiliation to a “government” group was established, GSPC assassinated the individual. 
5. GSPC, as it is currently (based on their operations), does not appear to be a “terrorist” group 
as much as an internal insurgency against the government, one that is trying to stay alive through 
shakedowns, roadblocks, and incursions to raise cash and other resources. There are a number 
of references and articles about GSPC’s ties to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden; in fact, a 
number of sources suggest bin Laden created GSPC. GSPC may be trying to tie itself to al-
Qaeda to survive the decline and “death” phase the group appears to be in. The implication is 
that this may broaden GSPC’s operations from regional, colonial, Algerian government-based 
targets to international targets. GSPC members have already used Afghan training camps. 
6. While there are civilian deaths, many times they are accompanied by the death of a 
“government” entity. There are times that civilians have been assassinated, but the majority of the 
time the “civilian” incidents are incursions, roadblocks, and shakedowns where the GSPC 
members take money and equipment while they preach their cause to the people. 
7. Shakedowns for money may be in response to the need to raise capital (i.e., amass a nest egg) 
before surrendering under amnesty provisions, though this appears to be conjecture and cannot 
be verified conclusively by the data. See GMP20060502380001, Algiers El Watan (Internet 
Version-WWW) in French, 02 May 06. 
8. Civilian total for Death, Injury, and Abductions was skewed because 32 tourists were 
kidnapped at one time and 11 more during another incident. 
9. “Elements” in the operational data from the OSC seem to represent 1 person, so 30 elements 
are 30 people. 
10. Many Civilian deaths were the result of walking into an improvised explosive device (IED) that 
may have been meant for a “Government” asset.  
Future Research 
The focus of this research paper was to descriptively analyze the operational information received 
from open source materials, namely the OSC. As a result, we encountered information shortfalls 
due to limited resources and data to verify and delve into many of the questions the data raised. 
Future research projects are possible. Some topics to consider:  
1. Maintain the database and GSPC review of OSC and other venues to provide a continual 
events log of GSPC operations. The aggregate data will be extremely beneficial for future study. 
2. Obtain complete weather data per date - Rainfall was originally to be considered as a possible 
variable affecting operations. However, rainfall was recorded by calendar date, not precise 
enough a measure to be useful. To wit, GSPC could conduct an operation such as a roadblock 
during dry conditions, and then terminate the operation at the first sign of imminent rain. 
Unfortunately, the imprecise data would mislead the analysis, suggesting that GSPC, having 
conducted an operation on the same date as recorded rainfall, actually operated in the rain. Such 
would be a false conclusion.  
3. Plot out by event the progress of the incidents by region, city - attempt to see migration of 
operations over time. 
4. Conduct a rigorous statistical analysis of the data obtained through the database. 
5. Research the various questions that arise from the charts, tables and data within the database. 
Peaks and valleys in operations appear in relation to time, location, tactic, etc. The data and time 
needed to research fully the “why’s” was too enormous for this paper, but could provide real 
insight into the tactics, abilities and hindrances GSPC associates with operations. 
6. Lay the data over the terrorist group lifecycle to see the four phases; determine if they are 
applicable to operational rise and decline. 
7. Lay in ideological phrases with the event log to see if there is a connection between rhetoric, 
affiliation with al Qaeda and group operations and survival. 
8. Conduct a similar review within OSC of government operations against GSPC. Lay results over 
this and future GSPC data to see if there is a correlation. 
9. Continually monitor and conduct a study into the amnesty period and acts conducted by the 
Algerian government to see if amnesty is an effective policy. 
10. Greater fidelity can be achieved in hypothesis validation if data is reviewed by cultural experts. 
Also, further insights into causal relationships between operational timeline and cultural activites 
can be identified if database construction follows specific cultural periods (i.e. Muslim calendar 
does not follow normal Western cycle, holiday calendar and summer vacation months are 
different and may impact operations). 
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